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Anti-Corruption Conference Report

March 30, 2015 by Robert Connolly

Last week I attended a conference at George Washington University Law School: “Drivers of Corruption and Institutional Responses: Are Current Anti-Corruption Instruments Effective?”  I believe this is an annual event at GW and this was the third year. The program is unique in that instead of focusing on legal proscriptions against corruption such as the FCPA, bribery law, competition regulation, etc., the conference examines broader questions such as: What Drives Corruption? Can Corruption be Measured? What Approaches to Corruption Have Been Effective?

A highlight of the program for me was the luncheon speaker, Sarah Chayes, who spoke on her recent book, “Thieves of State: Why Corruption Threatens Global Security.” No speaker has challenged me to think as much as Ms. Chayes did with her experience and insights. She spent many years in Afghanistan, first as a reporter and later with humanitarian reconstruction efforts. She also did extensive research for the book. My takeaway from her remarks is that large-scale corruption by state actors looting the public treasury for personal gain, and flaunting it with indescribable wealth, has been a large contributing factor to the Arab Spring uprisings and terrorism. A chapter in the book, which I’ve just started reading, is titled “Vertically Integrated Criminal Syndicates.” Ms. Chayes makes the connection between public corruption and civil unrest and raises serious security issues for US foreign policy.

Now, a word about public corruption in the form of public procurement bid rigging. Bid rigging was not a main issue of the conference but the subject mater reminded me of why, when I was a DOJ antitrust prosecutor, I enjoyed working public bid rigging cases more than any other form of price-fixing/bid rigging. Bid rigging on public projects strikes at the very foundation of government, leading the citizenry to believe government officials are either corrupt, incompetent or both. There are a number of reasons I believe competition enforcers, especially where competition regimes are fairly new, should devote substantial resources to public procurement bid rigging.

Double Dipping: If you want to rig a bid, you can pay off a public official for inside information. Or, you can collude with your competitors to decide who the winning bidder will be and have everyone inflate their bids. Or, you can do both! Public procurement bidding investigations may turn up a bribe to the procurement official to limit bidding, or turn a blind eye, as well as an agreement among the vendors to rig the bid. And, even in cases where public procurement officials are not on the “take,” they may be reluctant to speak out when they see what they believe is collusion. Prosecutions of public procurement corruption can help create not just more honest vendors—but public servants who feel supported if they do their job.

Public Perception: There are numerous economies around the world that are transitioning from a state-run becoming, or at least one where collaboration among competitors was accepted or event encouraged, to an economy where competition is the guiding principle. Old habits of collusion are hard to break. The easiest way to get the message out is with investigations, and where warranted, prosecution of bid rigging on public procurements. Also, I have found that public corruption cases can garner much more publicity than some other forms of cartels because the subject is of great interest to taxpayers.

Focused Damages: The current trend among enforcers is large international cartel price-fixing cases. And, it is true that these cartels can involve billions of dollars in commerce. Cumulatively, the overcharges are substantial. The large fines help competition agencies justify their budget to the political bodies that fund them. But, there is little reason to believe that the price-fixing of various auto parts has caused consumers to purchase fewer cars. However, when contractors rig public procurement bids for road construction projects, schools, hospitals, etc., there is more reason to believe there is less money in the public till for other projects. Part of this is because the harm is more concentrated (the public treasury) than price-fixing, which can overcharge thousands of consumers, but just a little each. Also, there is empirical evidence, and it has been my experience also, that bid rigging conspiracies are more effective at inflating prices than price-fixing cartels.

Vulnerable Victim: Public procurement can also be an easier target for unscrupulous bidders because the public procurement system can sometimes make it easier for vendors to rig bids. Bidding is often limited to prequalified bidders, letting vendors know who the competition is.   Also, an award to the lowest bidder, as opposed to ongoing negotiations, can provide vendors with the certainty needed to effectively collude. There are many other contributing factors that can make public procurement an “easy mark” for vendors inclined to rig bids, or just unable to resist the temptation to collude.

Public corruption takes many forms and it is likely that bid rigging is relatively minor compared to corrupt regimes simply looting the public treasury. But, to the extent countries have competition enforcement agencies that are in fact dedicated to free markets and competition, public procurement is an effective area to target.

Thanks for reading.

 

Filed Under: Blog

Anti-Cartel Day in Canada

March 26, 2015 by Robert Connolly

The Canadian Competition Bureau is celebrating “Anti-cartel Day: Helping businesses detect and prevent price-fixing and bid-rigging.” The press release is available here.

Below are some experts where the Commission provides many useful links:

 “The Bureau has developed resources to assist businesses and trade associations in recognizing and preventing cartel activity. The videos were made available on the Bureau’s Facebook page, YouTube channel and its website earlier this week, and include:

  • the Commissioner’s message on Anti-cartel Day;

  • Cartels: What you don’t know can hurt you!; and

  • Bid-rigging: Compete legally!

The press release has this quote from John Pecman, Commissioner of Competition:  “Cartels are corrosive to a healthy marketplace. Anti-cartel Day is a way for us to raise awareness as to the devastating effects of anti-competitive conduct but also to highlight the benefits of compliance for companies and the individuals managing them.”

The following helpful links are also in the press release:

  • Immunity Program
  • Leniency Program
  • Whistleblowing Initiative
  • Corporate Compliance Programs Bulletin

Kudos to Commissioner Pecman and the Canadian Competition Bureau for their efforts in publicizing broadly the benefits of competition/compliance and providing resources to support the effort.

Happy Anti-Cartel Day!

Filed Under: Blog

Recommended Article on the Auto Parts Cartel

March 23, 2015 by Robert Connolly

I am passing on this feature article by Dan Gearino of the Columbus Dispatch published on Sunday, March 22, 2015: Massive Price-Fixing Among Auto-Parts Manufacturers Hurt U.S. Car Buyers.  The article goes beyond the numbers of the record-breaking prosecutions and looks at some of the reasons the cartel flourished for so long and what the executives were (or weren’t) thinking.  First some familiar stats cited in the article:

  • So far, 33 companies have pleaded guilty and agreed to pay $2.4 billion in fines, and the investigation is ongoing.
  • In addition to company sanctions, 28 executives pleaded guilty to individual charges and most of them went to federal prison.  An additional 26 executives have been indicted but have not surrendered to authorities.

The following quotes are all excerpts from the article:

  • The prison sentences were a surprise, he said, because many executives considered this conduct to be merely an “administrative offense.”
  • “Some of the people who (received leniency) were some of the evil, evil people in this thing,” said a midlevel manager for one of the companies that pleaded guilty, a U.S. citizen, speaking on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to comment.
  • He described a culture in which decisions were made by Japanese executives, often working with Japanese executives at other companies, and in which competitors were used to working together.
  • Meanwhile, the many American employees of the companies, even high-level employees, felt shut out from big decisions. In the price-fixing cases, this turned out to be a good thing. All but one of the 54 people charged are Japanese.
  • “Certainly one of the options we will consider will be extraditing them [indicted foreign defendants] from the country where they are located,” said [Marvin] Price, criminal director of the department’s antitrust division.

There are many lessons to be learned from the auto parts cartel capers.  I’ll be writing on some of my thoughts in the future, as I’m sure many others will.

Thanks for reading.

Filed Under: Blog

Do Not Remove—Under Penalty of Law!

March 18, 2015 by Robert Connolly

When I was a boy, I was always puzzled but fearful of labels that I saw on pillows that read in bold print “Do Not Remove—Under Penalty of Law.” I was pretty sure that the cops wouldn’t know if I removed a label, but what if my parents ratted me out? And, as a Catholic School lad, I had to worry about the sin implications. If it was against the law, was it also a sin? A venial sin? (six to twelve months in purgatory). Or, a mortal sin? (eternal damnation—which seemed a little harsh just for removing a label). In any event, being fairly cautious, I never did remove a pillow label, though I may have committed a few more serious offenses in my youth.

These thoughts crossed my mind the other day I when I read about an ongoing case in the Second Circuit, In the Matter of a Warrant to Search a Certain Email Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corp., Case number 14-2985. Microsoft is challenging a district court order that it produce documents located overseas that were sought by a validly executed search warrant. Microsoft claims the documents are out of the reach of the government while settled law seems to be that, at least as it relates to subpoenas, the documents are producible. The magistrate and district court judge ordered that the documents be produced and Microsoft is currently pressing its appeal in the Second Circuit.

I’ll follow up when a decision is reached, but I thought I would comment on why you should never destroy foreign located documents in an Antitrust Division investigation. An Antitrust Division issued grand jury subpoena duces tecum will typically call for documents “wherever located.” While a company needs a presence in the United States to be validly served with a grand jury subpoena, once it is served, the company is on notice that responsive documents must be preserved. It may seem that a company with an office in the United States but headquarters overseas, might have little to lose by destroying overseas documents. But, this is clearly not the case.

Overseas Conduct:  US Consequences

Let’s assume an international company headquartered in Taiwan is served with a subpoena issued by an antitrust grand jury for documents. The subpoena will likely call for relevant documents (pricing memos; communications with competitors and many more demands). The subpoena may call for the production of documents “wherever located.” In my experience, the Antitrust Division will defer production of documents located overseas. Is this a good time to get rid of the incriminating evidence. No! Here’s couple of reasons why:

Antitrust Division’s Position on Destruction Of Foreign-Based Documents

Policy: The Division considers the destruction of foreign-based documents, like the destruction of domestic documents, for the purpose of impeding an investigation to be a criminal offense. It will use every available means to prosecute and punish individuals and corporations who engage in such activity.

Rationale: An executive who destroys foreign-based documents for the purpose of covering up his company’s participation in a conspiracy may subject himself and his employer to serious sentencing consequences. The executive and the company may be charged with a violation of the “omnibus clause” of 18 U.S.C. § 1503, which carries a potential 10-year sentence against the individual and a $500,000 fine against the company. Moreover, if the company is convicted of the antitrust offense, it may face substantially greater fines, even if it is not formally charged with obstruction as a separate offense in an indictment or information.”

This excerpt is from a Division publication: “Negotiating the Waters of International Cartel Prosecution.”

Here are some of the practical implications of the Division’s policy:

  •             Amnesty—A company that destroys overseas evidence is not going to have the “goods” to quality for leniency. It is hard to offer “full and complete cooperation” if key evidence has been destroyed. In one situation I know of, the document destruction was limited to one individual. The company was still able to obtain leniency but that individual was charged with obstruction.
  •             Plea Agreements—Even a company that doesn’t qualify for leniency is likely to seek to negotiate a plea agreement if the Division obtains indictable evidence through another source (i.e. the company that won the race for leniency). If a company has destroyed documents after learning of the investigation, it is going to pay a heavier price in terms of a fine for the cartel conduct. It’s cooperation will be less valuable without the destroyed evidence, and the Antitrust Division takes obstruction very seriously. The quickest way to get on the bad side of the Division is to tamper with the integrity of its investigations. The Division is going to “send a message” when it encounters obstruction—and the message is communicated in $$.
  •             Separate Charges—In some cases, to make sure the message is loud and clear, the Division may even insist on that a company that pleads to the cartel charge also a plead to a separate charge of obstruction.

Corporations Don’t Destroy Documents—People Do

A corporation is responsible for the actions of an employee who destroys documents in many cases. And as indicated above, an employee’s actions can have serious negative consequences for the company. But, the consequences can be even worse for the individual, if the Division has substantial evidence that a person destroyed evidence—or ordered that evidence be destroyed. Some of the consequences are:

  •             Carve Outs—In most corporate plea agreements, the Division offers non-prosecution protection for cooperating individuals, but preserves for prosecution those it deems to be most culpable. These individuals are referred to as “carve-outs”—individuals not protected by the plea agreement. Like Santa Claus, the Division has a “naughty” list. The number of carve-outs can vary, but an individual whom the Division believes destroyed evidence (or otherwise obstructed an investigation) is almost certainly going to be on the naughty list and carved out.
  •             Indictment—Not all carve outs are eventually indicted but an executive who has been carved out of a corporate plea agreement because the Division believes he has engaged in obstruction is likely to be indicted for the cartel offense. And, if the evidence of obstruction is sufficiently strong, the Division will include counts in the indictment setting forth the obstruction.
  •             Extradition—A foreign executive who is indicted by the Division constantly has to be concerned about international travel. The Division will seek an Interpol “Red Notice” so that such individuals may be detained anywhere in the world. But, an individual will only be extradited if the conduct is also a crime in the country where the individual is being detained. There is a material difference in international norms regarding the condemnation of price-fixing compared to obstruction. While this is a very general statement, relatively few countries consider price-fixing a criminal offense (and even fewer actually incarcerate individuals convicted of price-fixing). But, obstruction of justice is universally considered a crime. An individual who the Division has placed on a Red Notice is in a much more precarious position if the indictment contains charges of obstruction of justice.

Your Ace in the Hole

It may seem obvious that electronic evidence should not be destroyed because multiple copies probably exist and you’ll get caught. (Although in the “fog of war” at the beginning an investigation, “obvious” mistakes are made in a panic). Suppose, however, that Mr. Cartel has handwritten notes of every cartel meeting listing every member that attended, what was agreed to, etc. If these documents met an untimely demise at the shredder, surely that would be a good thing? No!   These documents may be your “get out of jail free” card. The “hotter” the document (and uniqueness can make a document very hot), the more valuable it is to the Division.   A plea negotiation is based in part on: how culpable is the defendant?; how strong is the government’s case? and how badly does the government want your cooperation? A hot document can be very valuable, particularly in a price-fixing case.

Conclusion

Individuals should not destroy documents, even if they are “certain” they can get away with it. But, and this is a subject for another post, this has to be emphasized to employees as part of a robust compliance program. (Phew–I almost got to the end without using “robust”).  A “preservation letter” at the beginning of an investigation is likely to be too little too late. And, it is not too helpful to simply say “Do Not Remove Under Penalty of Law” without explaining why.

Thanks for reading.

Filed Under: Blog

You’re Invited–This Thursday: March Madness Happy Hour

March 16, 2015 by Robert Connolly

GeyerGorey

Please join me and my partners for some after work fun and watch some early round NCAA March Madness basketball tournament action:

When:             March 19, 2015

Time:              5:00 pm to 8:30 pm

Where:

  • 920 I (Eye) Street, NW  (City Center)
  • 4th Floor Lounge Room
  • Washington, DC 20001

Why:                Say hello, have a beer/pizza, and watch some early round NCAA basketball.

RSVP:              Please let me know you are able to come:  robert.connolly@geyergorey.com

Thanks.

Filed Under: Blog

Miscellaneous Notes from Around the World

March 12, 2015 by Robert Connolly

One of the ongoing debates among cartel practitioners and scholars is whether penalties are sufficient to deter cartel behavior. This question has come up in the context of possible reforms to the Sentencing Guidelines with some advocating that both jail and corporate fines need to be increased. It is also an issue being debated regarding the FTAIA and the Motorola Mobility decision—if there is deference by the US to foreign enforcement regimes, will cartels be undeterred?

In this context, I noticed three items of interest this week. They certainty don’t settle the question of whether there is a sufficient amount of deterrence, but they clearly demonstrate that deterrence is ever-increasing.

1.  Conference:  “The Future of Competition Law and Policy in the ASEAN Countries: Issues and Challenges”

The first item is a conference on Competition Law in ASEAN countries. The conference was inspired by the recommendation of ASEAN Regional Guidelines on Competition Policy that all ASEAN countries introduce nation-wide competition policy and law by 2015. Also, the conference is being held just before International Competition Network (ICN) annual meeting, which will take place in Sydney from April 28 to May 1st, 2015.

Panelists at the conference include:

  • Aubeck Kam, Chairman, Competition Commission, Singapore
  • Siti N. Yaakob, Chairman, Competition Commission, Malaysia
  • Geronimo L. Sy, Former Chair, ASEAN Experts Group on Competition
  • Muhammad N. Messi, President, Indonesian Commission for the Supervision of Business Competition, Jakarta
  • Frédéric Jenny, Chairman, OECD Competition Committee, Paris
  • Laurence Idot, Member, Competition Authority, Paris
  • William E. Kovacic, Professor, George Washington University, Washington, D.C.

The conference is sponsored by Concurrences Journal, in partnership with ESSEC Singapore and Sorbonne-Assas International Law School. If you’re in the neighborhood and interested in the program you can find more details here. Also, if you do attend the program and would like to write a post about the conference as its relates to the panel on “Cartels and Leniency in Asean Countries,”  please let me know. I would be interested in publishing that summary.

 2. Antitrust in Colombia

The government of Colombia is wrapping up an eight-year investigation of the local cement and sugar industries. “The evidence phase has concluded, and we are entering the final decision phase now,” said Pablo Felipe Robledo del Castillo, head of the Superintendency of Industry and Commerce (SIC) on Monday, March 9.  The investigation findings should be announced this summer. The subjects of the cement investigation were Cemex and Holcim, two companies that have been investigated by countless competition authorities around the world.

In 2014, the Colombian competition agency filed price-fixing charges against toilet paper and disposable diaper companies. The country is also considering increasing its sanctions by changing from a maximum fine of around $25 million to a fine based on a percentage of the companies’ revenues or equity.

3.  Yogurt Too? (Sigh)

Just today, France fined yogurt makers over $203 million for price-fixing (here). The conspirators struck deals in hotels rooms and used special phone lines created to avoid detection. But, leniency, (the great cartel buster), prompted Yoplait (owned by General Mills) to blow the whistle. The cartels operated from 2006 to 2012.

These news reports certainly don’t answer the question of whether there is sufficient deterrence. They do show that cartel enforcement is world-wide endeavor, not just of interest in the US/EU. But, enforcement actions also show that cartels continue to be formed—even when the participants, as in the French yogurt cartel, know the conduct is illegal and take great pains to (unsuccessfully) keep the cartel secret.

Thanks for reading.

Filed Under: Blog

The FTAIA and International Comity — Deference to Foreign Enforcement

March 4, 2015 by Robert Connolly

I am delighted to be a speaker with two very distinguished co-panelists for an ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Joint Conduct and International Committees teleconference:  The FTAIA and International Comity — Deference to Foreign Enforcement.  The program will be held on Monday March 9, 2015 from 12:00 to 1:30 pm EST.

The panel will consider how, or whether, the FTAIA should be applied to accommodate competition enforcement policies of countries in which cartel members reside. They will compare extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act to extraterritorial application of competition laws by other countries and will weigh foreign interest in restraints on Sherman Act reach, taking into account amicus brief filings by foreign competition agencies in U.S. appellate court.

Moderator:

*Thomas J. Collin, Thompson Hine LLP, Cleveland, Ohio

Speakers:
*Robert E. Connolly, GeyerGorey LLP, Washington, D.C.
*Eleanor Fox, NYU School of Law, New York, NY
*Jacques Steenbergen, Belgian Competition Authority

To register for the program, click here.

Filed Under: Blog

Invitations to Collude Invite Big Trouble

March 3, 2015 by Robert Connolly

On Thursday February 26th I enjoyed a day long Symposium on Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act hosted by BakerHostetler and organized and moderated by my friend and former colleague Carl Hittinger. The conference focused on the history of Section 5, its current scope and where it may be headed. There was particular discussion about whether the FTC should have guidelines to explain and limit the application of Section 5.

While I found the entire conference interesting, of particular interest to me was the discussion of “invitation to collude” cases, which is a way of saying to a competitor “Would you like to form a cartel with me?” Section 5 broadly prohibits “[un]fair methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.” One way Section 5 has been used by the FTC has been to charge invitations to collude cases.

An invitation to collude case can arise when one competitor (or a group of competitors) reaches out to another competitor to invite the competitor to agree to fix prices.  An invitation to collude investigation/case arises usually when there is some specificity in the offer—much like contract analysis. General grousing about prices in an industry, while extremely foolish and may draw an investigation, is not likely to result in a formal charge. And, in US v. Foley, 598 F. 2d 1343 (4th Cir. 1979)  a realtor hosted a dinner for seven other realtors and announced he didn’t care what others did, he was raising his commission. Some discussion ensued from which a jury concluded that an agreement has been reached.  The realtors were indicted and convicted.

One example of the type of “invitation to collude” case that the FTC has brought was against two barcode resellers where the principals of two companies invited a third competitor to collude. The FTC complaints charged that on August 4, 2013, an executive of Instant reached out to a competitor, Nationwide, and proposed that the two companies, along with a third barcode seller, “Competitor A,” together raise their prices.   The Instant executive then allegedly then sent a similar email invitation to Competitor A.  The next day, Nationwide forwarded Instant’s message to Competitor A, asking for its thoughts on the proposal. Without agreement from Competitor A, Nationwide and Instant did not take action to raise prices, but allegedly continued to discuss by email a possible price-fixing scheme for barcodes, conditioned on the participation of Competitor A. Competitor A never responded to any email nor did it agree to participate in the proposed scheme.

In a public statement the FTC said: “The Commission charged Instant and Nationwide with inviting an agreement to raise prices in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act. The FTC has not alleged, however, that the invitations to collude resulted in an agreement on price or other terms of competition. Because under some circumstances, an agreement on price or other terms or an invitation to collude could potentially constitute criminal conduct, the FTC routinely refers such cases to the Department of Justice to investigate.”

In fact, the Department of Justice has prosecuted “invitations to collude” criminally as attempted wire frauds.  United States v. Ames Sintering, 927 F. 2d 232 (6th Cir. 1990)(bid rigging attempt); United States v. Critical Industries, Crim. No. 90-00318 (D. N.J. July 24, 1990), 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶45,090 (Case 3722A) (price-fixing attempt). In these cases, the person seeking to fix prices/rig bids reached out to a competitor who then recorded conversations for the FBI.   Criminal fraud charges followed.

It is not clear why the FTC has brought some invitation to collude case criminally while the Antitrust Division has brought such cases criminally.  There are relatively few invitation to collude cases brought so it is not possible to draw conclusions. But, the strength/weakness of the evidence is a significant factor.  The amount of commerce involved also is a factor in the decision.  And if a competitor makes a collusive proposal in person, there may be no mail or wire use to support a criminal fraud charge.

The “Why is this case civil?’ question can also come up where an invitation to collude is accepted; i.e. there is an actual agreement to fix prices.  An FTC case I found curious was the case against Blue Rhino and AmeriGas. The FTC alleged that the companies secretly agreed and illegally coordinated on reducing the amount of propane in their tanks sold to a key customer. In 2008, Blue Rhino and AmeriGas planned to implement a price increase by reducing the amount of propane in their exchange tanks from 17 pounds to 15 pounds, without a corresponding reduction in the wholesale price.  This was not an invitation to collude case.  The invitation was accepted and the agreement led to a 13% price increase.  The conspiracy was carried out at the highest level of the two companies over a period of months.  

The FTC’s administrative complaint alleged, among other things:

The key to implementing the price increase was forcing Walmart, the largest customer, to accept it. The FTC’s administrative complaint states that:

  • Faced with resistance from Walmart, Blue Rhino and AmeriGas colluded by secretly agreeing that neither would deviate from their proposal to reduce the fill level to Walmart. They worked together to take the steps necessary to push Walmart to promptly accept the fill reduction.
  • On or about July 10, 2008, and continuing for three months thereafter, sales executives from the two Respondents communicated repeatedly by telephone and email to apprise each other of the status of their discussions with Walmart and to encourage each other to hold firm to convince Walmart to accept the reduction in fill.
  • This concerted action had the purpose and effect of raising the effective wholesale prices at which Blue Rhino and AmeriGas sold propane exchange tanks to Walmart, as well as to other customers in the United States.
  • This reduction in fill level was in effect a 13% increase in the price of the propane.
At the symposium I asked FTC Commissioner Deborah L. Feinstein why this case was brought civilly as an FTC administrative action instead of as a criminal case by the Antitrust Division.  Commissioner Feinstein understandably was not at liberty to discuss details of the case and could only say that the FTC would not have brought the case civilly if the Division had wanted to charge it criminally.  I can only speculate why the case was a civil case.  One possibility is that the evidence was not strong enough for a criminal case–proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  Or, the evidence may have come voluntarily from the defendants in return for an agreement to bring a civil action.  Just speculation though.
It is important to remember that an FTC investigation for either an invitation to collude or an actual agreement to fix prices, can, at any time when the facts warrant, be referred to the Antitrust Division for criminal prosecution.
Thanks for reading.

PS.  The FTC investigates a wide variety of consumer fraud.  In any FTC investigation, a civil investigation may be referred to an appropriate criminal prosecution office whenever the facts warrant.

 

 

Filed Under: Blog

India–CCI Imposes Maximum Penalty on Trade Association

February 25, 2015 by Robert Connolly

In this India Update 2015 Volume 4, Avinash Amarnath reports on a recent decision of the CCI and the thin evidence that still led to imposition of a maximum fine.

CCI fines All India Motor Transport Congress for calling for price hike

The Competition Commission of India (CCI) imposed the maximum penalty of 10% of the average turnover on the All India Motor Transport Congress (AIMTC) the apex trade association for road transport service providers (both cargo and passenger) in India.

The CCI found that AIMTC had called for a hike of 15% in freight charges following an announcement of increase in diesel prices by state run oil marketing companies. AIMTC tried to argue that there was no evidence such as written circulars, directions or minutes of such a decision except for news reports which could not be considered as credible evidence without other corroborative evidence. Further, AIMTC argued that in any event, the members had, in fact not acted upon such a call.

The CCI, while observing that evidence was generally bound to be sparse in cartel investigations and an agreement could be inferred even in the absence of written circulars or directions found that:

  1. AIMTC had already been penalized for similar conduct in the past under the old Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) law.
  2. Two newspaper reports of two different officials of AIMTC located at two different places being quoted on exactly the same decision can only show that there was a collective decision on behalf of AIMTC to call for a price hike.
  3. The evidence on record showed that members of AIMTC had in fact hiked prices following such a call.
  4. One member had expressly admitted that it always followed the decisions of AIMTC.
  5. In the past, AIMTC, describing itself as the mother body for the road transport fraternity had given similar collective calls for a strike.

The CCI imposed the maximum percentage of penalty permissible under the statute taking into account the fact that AIMTC was a repeat offender having already been penalized under the old MRTP law. The CCI has also decided to proceed against the members of the AIMTC and noted that since these members had not filed their replies to the Director General’s investigation report, orders would be passed against such members separately.

A burning issue that this case brings to the fore is that of sufficiency of evidence in cartel investigations and the need to encourage leniency applications. The CCI cannot simply use the fact that evidence is bound to be scarce in cartel investigations and penalize parties with minimal evidence. Decisions of the CCI have serious penal consequences for parties and due process dictates that decisions need to be robust enough to withstand judicial scrutiny. The CCI needs to take serious steps towards encouraging leniency applications. This would ensure that the CCI is able to unearth sufficient evidence in cartel investigations. It is not surprising that in mature jurisdictions like the EU and the US, almost all cartel decisions nowadays arise from leniency applications.

The full decision of the CCI is available here.

Filed Under: Blog

Concurrences Antitrust Writing Awards–Please Vote

February 24, 2015 by Robert Connolly

Several months ago I wrote a Cartel Capers blog entry (here) discussing a suggested approach for the Seventh Circuit to follow in deciding Motorola Mobility when the Court reheard the case.  I also wrote a longer article (here) published in the Competition Policy International’s FTAIA issue. To my surprise and delight, Judge Posner in Motorola Mobility v. AU Optronics, 775 F. 3d 816 (7th Cir. 2015), cited both Cartel Capers and the CPI article. The article was quoted at length in the opinion.  This article has now been nominated for a Concurrences writing award.

The aim of the Concurrences Antitrust Writing Awards is to promote competition scholarship and to contribute to competition advocacy. The 2015 Antitrust Writing Awards Jury contributes to this achievement by selecting the best writings published in 2014. The articles are selected by the Jury and by Readers. The Jury consists of a Board, an Academic and a Business Steering Committees composed of the leading academics and counsels. Readers of Concurrences Journal and its sister publication e-Competitions contribute to the selection process by voting for articles. Click here to see the Jury.  You can check out all of the nominated articles on various subjects here.

Unlike many elections where one reluctantly votes for the lesser of two evils, every article nominated is terrific. I am honored to be included in this group. I would appreciate it if you would click on this link and vote for my article.

Thanks for reading…. and voting.

Filed Under: Blog

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The US Supreme Court has called cartels "the supreme evil of antitrust." Price fixing and bid rigging may not be all that evil as far as supreme evils go, but an individual can get 10 years in jail and corporations can be fined hundreds of millions of dollars. This blog will provide news, insight and analysis of the world of cartels based on the many years my colleagues and I have as former feds with the Antitrust Division, USDOJ.

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